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Abstract 
This study evaluates whether access to real-time customised idiosyncratic 
agricultural information over extended seasons improves the value of such 
information among farmers. We conduct a controlled randomised experiment in 
the Indian state of Karnataka. The study employs the difference-in-difference 
method to a panel of households comparing the differential valuation of 
information during the post-intervention period between treatment (participant) 
and control (non-participant) farmers relative to the outcomes observed during a 
pre-intervention period. We find robust evidence of the intervention showing 
significantly positive impacts on the valuation of agricultural information among 
treatment farmers relative to the control farmers. A difference of each one unit 
improvement in information access is found to be associated with 53 percent 
average increase in the mean valuation of the information. The result indicates 
that farmers value information that is comprehensive, reliable, real-time and 
idiosyncratic as opposed to the more generic or piecemeal information. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Starting with Adam Smith, economists have arrived at a consensus that information availability 
(access) is both costly and valuable component of efficient markets; “knowledge is power” (Stigler, 
1961:213). To overcome the perceived information failures in agricultural sector, many governments 
have long been producing and distributing information on appropriate agricultural practices to 
farming community for technology adoption and to impact agricultural productivity. Such publically 
provided information is an ongoing effort of governments in developing countries to assist farmers 
to become more productive and efficient (Maffioli et al, 2011; Just et al. 2002). While various 
innovations such as the Farmers’ Helpline are made available to make such information effective, 
however, serious concerns remain about the delivery of information valued by farmers. Increasingly, 
additional sources of information than solely relying on publically provided information services are 
given emphasis to diffuse information on agricultural technology and farm practices to streamline 
the agricultural development process1. 
The reason for emphasis on alternative efforts on information supply is mainly due to the weak  
adoption of improved practices in developing countries, which is well documented (see Aker, 2011; 
                                                          
 Purnima Purohit and Arjunan Subramanian are at the College of Social Science (Economics), Adam Smith 
Business School, University of Glasgow, Scotland, UK. Gopal Naik and B. Swaminathan are at the Indian 
Institute of Management (IIM), Bangalore, India. The paper is work-in-progress under the ongoing experiment 
in India. The contact author/email for this article is Purnima.Purohit@glasgow.ac.uk 
1
 In the context of structural and organisational change in agriculture, explosion of information technology, 
growing sophistication of farmers and decision-makers, problem of incentives of public servants for 
accountability to farmers, weak evidence of impact and shifts in conceptions of the appropriate role of the 
state in the economy, some have questioned the role of public and private sector actors in providing 
agricultural information services (Waddington et al., 2014; Aker, 2011; WDR, 2008; Anderson and Feder, 2007; 
Just et al., 2002).  
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Dinar, 1996). There are increasing numbers of theoretical and empirical literatures to explain the 
determinants of adoption of agricultural technology in different context. Economists have developed 
a framework to study the value of information in specific farm activity contexts. Typically, farm 
outcomes in the absence of information are compared to farm outcomes when information is 
available to estimate the value of information. Also, typically, studies analysed the value of a single 
or generic set of information to farmers, when each of whom might have different information need 
as well as uncertainty faced by the individual. (e.g. – see Suri, 2011 and others in Aker’s, 2011; 
Anderson and Feder’s, 2007 review of economic literature on agriculture extension). 
While the findings differ in the existing literature according to the type of information and context, 
the key measure of value of information is focused on production. The mixed evidence on the 
efficacy of the farm information makes it difficult to ascertain whether it is due to the differences in 
the mode of information dissemination or methodological challenges associated with evaluating 
information programme without plausible exogenous variation (Aker, 2011; Birkhaeuser et al., 
1991). It has become clear that we continue to lack the basic understanding of patterns of use of 
information by the economic agents, the roles of different types of information and individual’s 
attitude and aptitude towards learning and application of information. 
In this paper, we examine a hypothesis that display of low yields, or unscientific practices after 
information bundle is provided are not outcomes of subjective bias attributed to prior poor 
agricultural practices or learning failure. This is not an improbable proposition given that farmers 
face many different types of uncertainty. Yields may fluctuate due to unfavourable weather, pest 
and disease problems, political economic factors such as labour markets and trade regulations (Just 
et al., 2002). Farmers may learn, value and appreciate the significance of the agricultural information 
that need not necessarily always result in higher yields. Hence, examining yield outcomes to 
evaluate farmer’s learning, as done by some recent studies, may not always be appropriate (for 
example, see table 2 in Aker, 2011 for compilation of such studies). Using the field experiment, we 
ask if better valuation of information by economic agents (farmers) is thought to make up a large 
share of the learning return, which many a time might not reflect in farm outcome, such as yields or 
pattern of use of information captured in agricultural practices. Can we estimate the farmer’s 
valuing of information conditional on his ability to acquire and process information (knowledge) as a 
proxy of learning effects or a critical determinant of economic performance? 
It is useful to give an example to demonstrate the line of thought from our experience with paddy 
farmers in South of India last season in 2014.  
 
‘Though many varieties of rice exists, a paddy farmer in a rain-fed area of Southern India 
makes plenty of investment by sowing new variety seeds in the season to reap high 
returns on it. The new variety seeds supported high yields and were also equipped with 
an adaptation measure to deal with limiting water resource. Nonetheless, farmer’s 
expectation to reap high yields depends on many features of cropping cycle in the 
season. One of the important criteria for regulating rice plant growth and yield is the age 
of seedlings at transplanting. A farmer, knowing that he is supposed to transplant young 
seedlings between 12 to 15 day old, as the yield declines of older seedlings, chose to 
transplant more than 55 day old seedlings. This farmer made choice between loosing 
entire investment of the season or reconcile with sub-optimal rice yield. The argument of 
‘to do it right’ by him required sufficient depth of water management soon after 
transplanting. The farmer faced delayed rains in the season. He delayed transplanting 
which primarily has to be attributed to water shortage, or climate change, than it has to 
do with his knowledge grasping. This farmer, and many in the sample, is likely to be 
served with low yield. In gist, farmer had learnt to lay foundation for determining plant 
growth and yield but could not practice it’. (Based on authors’ experience in field 
experiment, August 2014)  
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Table 1 presents more of such selected field-based observations that were found prominent than 
others to indicate issues likely to affect yields despite the use of additional information/learning to 
reduce uncertainty and increase yield outcomes. Table 2 presents the field observations to indicate 
incorrect farm practices that were addressed in tailored-way through treatment intervention.  The 
two tables distinguish in terms of importance of the information packaging both to impart right 
knowledge and to manage shocks in real time, while both having effect on growth dynamics and 
overall yield potential. The potential impact of having access to better information on agricultural 
productivity, output prices, economic growth and poverty alleviation have been discussed in 
different contexts, this study, for the first time, utilizes a randomized control field experiment and 
surveys before and after the experiment to investigate the impact of ICT-supported real-time 
comprehensive agricultural information on treated farmers’ valuing of the farm information in the 
Indian state of Karnataka. 
More specifically, to examine our hypothesis in this paper, which is a part of large project theme, we 
evaluate whether exposure to intensive agricultural information over extended seasons improves 
the value of information among treatment farmers to reflect gains from the educational 
intervention. The presence of uncertainty in the farming sector, either due to weather or market, 
lead farmers to value information that is comprehensive, real-time and idiosyncratic as opposed to 
the more generic or piecemeal information provided in some recent experimental studies.  For 
example, farmer would want information to use crops that will resist the extremes of weather, 
particularly crop varieties that are more tolerant to weather variations, and lower levels of inputs 
than would be optimal in a predictable world because of the risk of losing the investment altogether 
(Timmer et al. 1983). In view of it, yield outcomes might not always reveal the significance of 
learning from extension services.   
Studies also suggest that there are temporal dimension of extension services (Maffioli et al. 2011). 
‘How valuable information is depends on the context: because information is not useful in one year 
does not imply that it is never useful’ (Fafchamps and Minten, 2012:10). 
 
Table 1: Field Issues likely to interfere with treatment intervention outcome  
S.no Problem / Issue Reason Suggestion to deal with 
problem 
1.  In Paddy cultivation – 
transplantation of aged 
seedlings (>55days) 
Delayed monsoon and water shortage 
in Tungabhadra river hampered 
transplanting detrimentally.  
In order to encourage the 
tiller production – split 
dose of fertilizer needed- 
Basal N application of 
50% of the recommended 
dose. 
2.  In Paddy, appropriate row-to-
row and plant-to-plant spacing 
was not maintained.  
 
Due to shortage of labour, farmers 
gave contract based transplanting on 
area basis (Rs 2000/ac). Contractor 
and his team completed the 
transplanting with wider row-to-row 
and plant-to-plant spacing (20-25×20-
25 cm) for quick coverage of the area. 
For short, long duration variety’ and 
even aged seedlings also. 
Correct Spacing (cm): Short-15×10, 
Medium- 20×10 and Long- 20×15 
Project’s field staffs 
suggested requesting the 
contractor for 
transplanting with proper 
spacing and to adhere to 
planting instructions. 
3.  Pests migrated from farmer’s 
adjoining unsprayed field to his 
healthy field. 
When neighbourhood farmer did not 
spray or maintained the plants 
properly in his field, pests migrated 
from unattended field to treated 
farmer’s field because insects have 
preference towards healthy crops. 
 
For that, adding 
Azadirachtin (neem 
formulation) 2ml/lit along 
with chemical insecticides 
for insect repellent action 
was suggested. 
4.  Untimely fall of cotton square in 
the healthy plants. 
 
 
The year (2014) received off-season 
rainfall, which was in the flowering 
season.  As a consequence of it, most 
of the cotton squares dropped from the 
Project’s field staffs 
suggested to spray 2 kg 
of DAP, 1 kg all 19 
(19:19:19) along with 
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plants. 
 
70ml of planofix for an 
acre (NAA) for controlling 
the further shedding of 
flowers and increasing the 
boll setting.  
5.  Obtaining agricultural chemical on 
credit from the local chemical shop 
affected the treatment intervention. 
On occasions when the 
recommended chemical is not 
available, treated farmers are given 
some other local branded chemical 
as a replacement which not 
necessarily was suitable.  
Money problem:  most of the farmers are 
not in a position to purchase chemical by 
direct cash payment.   
 
Field staffs not only 
recommended the sprays 
but also provided 
information on the reliable 
outlets to buy them with 
explanations about problem 
(binding constrain) under  
credit  purchases  
 
6.  Similarly, yield difference exist 
between irrigated and rain-fed 
cotton fields 
 
Non-availability of water in major 
critical stage of cotton crops viz., 
germination, flowering and boll 
formation stage affects yield 
optimization.  
Consistent Problem  
Source: Field Experiment, 2013-2014 
 
Farmers need adequate cognitive space and time to make the best decisions for themselves before 
they adjust to new information and apply them in their agricultural practices (WDR, 2015). Akerlof 
and Kranton’s (2000) incorporates psychology and sociology of identity into an economic model of 
behaviour and describes that unobservable factors such as the pattern of learning support 
preferences and constraints stemming from farmer’s own social identity also play key role in 
influencing farmer’s decision-making behaviour.  
 
Table 2: Widespread incorrect farm practices that were addressed in tailored-way through 
treatment intervention, besides providing customised extension services 
S. no Problem / Issue Reason Advice to deal with problem 
1.  Farmers do not apply Phosphate 
(P) fertilizer in paddy and cotton 
crops as basal dosage. 
‘P’ fertilizer is very essential for 
earlier stage of root establishment 
in all the crops 
Based on soil test report, 
undertaken in the project, 75% of 
soil in the study area is deficient in 
‘P’ content. 
Lack of awareness about ‘P’ 
fertilizer 
 
Project’s field staffs explained to 
the farmers both the usefulness 
and timing of application of ‘P’ 
fertilizers. A change is observed 
amongst the farmers and farmers 
started using (P) during the basal 
preparation.  
 
2.  In paddy fields, farmers tend to 
overlook basal dose of fertilizer 
which is related partly to their 
financial problem. 
It is found that farmers tend to 
spend good share of their cost 
in land preparation, nursery 
preparation, seedling 
transportation and 
transplanting. However, they 
face money-shortage at the 
time of transplanting 
preventing them to invest in 
fertilizers. 
Project’s field staffs explained 
usefulness of right use of the 
fertilizers during basal to the 
farmers and also accessing Kisan 
Credit card to address some of the 
financial problems i.e., to be able to 
purchase farm inputs at the right 
time of cropping cycle.   
3.  In paddy , field- to-field irrigation is the 
most common practice in the study 
area.  This has dangers of spread of 
pests and diseases  and leaching of 
fertilizer. 
Lack of awareness among the 
farmers 
 
Project’s field staffs explained 
pitfalls of such practice and helped 
to install separate pipe line for 
individual field for discrete irrigation 
channel. 
 
4.  Water stagnation in cotton field is 
one of the commonly witnessed 
problems in the study area. It is not 
Heavy rainfall and improper 
drainage facilities lead to 
waterlogging in the fields.  
Project’s field staffs advised farmers 
to create proper drainage facilities to 
avoid further damage. For quicker 
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good as cotton is moister sensitive 
crop and moisture affects the yield 
quality.  Water stagnation affects 
aeration in root zone of the cotton. 
As a result, roots are unable to 
uptake the nutrition from the soil 
directly affecting the yield quality.   
recovery, the treatment experts 
suggested the use of foliar spray of 2 kg 
of DAP and 1 kg of All 19 (19:19: 19) 
@10 days interval.  
 
 
5.  No proper row-to-row and plant-to-
plant spacing is maintained in chilli 
and cotton crops. 
 
Farmers tend to maintain >120-
130 cm row-to-row spacing, which 
is waste in land usage.   
 
It was found that farmers 
use blade harrow (kunttae) 
implement by using animals 
for weed management. This 
practice makes them to 
maintain wide spacing 
between rows.   
Here Project’s field staffs 
recommend 120 X 45cm spacing, so 
that row-to-row weeding can be 
carried out with the help of implement 
and plant-to-plant weeding can be 
done as hand weeding. This allows 
increasing the plant population and 
thereby increasing the yield.  
6.  Improper thinning of chilli. 
 
Lack awareness of the 
farmer/incorrect 
understanding. 
 
Project’s field staffs explained the 
benefits of thinning.  
Also, field demonstration (1m
2
 area) 
was carried out to facilitate the 
learning.  
7.  Farmers tend to apply more than two 
chemical for single group of insect 
pest. It leads to increase in cost of 
cultivation as well as insect 
resistance and environmental 
pollution. 
 
Misguidance by pesticide 
dealers/ lack of awareness 
among farmers. 
Project’s field experts explained 
about use of right  chemicals and 
provided tailored dose in a printed 
slip to the farmers.  
8.  Unchecked usage of growth-
promoters by farmers due to 
misguided advice of pesticide 
shops- for their own benefit. 
This leads to increase in the cost 
of cultivation. 
 
Misguidance of pesticide 
dealers/ lack of awareness 
among farmers how to use 
plants growth promoters or 
untimely shedding of flower. 
Suggested the foliar spray of 2 kg of 
DAP, 1 kg all 19 (19:19: 19) and 70 
ml of planofix in an acre (NAA) for 
controlling the flower shedding and 
boll development. 
9.  Inappropriate selection of crop (i.e. 
unsuitable crop selection in 
relation to type of soil/area). 
Due to the high market prices of 
cotton in previous harvest year 
(last year), most of the rice 
producing farmers switched to 
cotton farming. Farmers, thus, 
cultivated cotton on low land 
area, shallow soil and stoned 
soil. 
Cotton needs deep black soil 
with high fertility by nature 
because cotton crops are long 
deep rooted crops (>90cm) 
 
Project’s field experts advised to 
create proper drainage facilities to 
reduce excess water in the soil. For 
quick recovery, the foliar spray of 2 
kg of DAP, 1 kg all 19 (19:19: 19) 
@10 days interval was suggested to 
reduce flower shedding and improve 
boll development. 
 
Source: Field Experiment, 2013-2014 
 
In our randomized field experiment, farmers’ valuing of information might reflect gain in new farm 
learning and acceptability of additional information service. However, literature suggests that in 
practice, valuing of information (willingness to pay) for farm information service has been slow to 
emerge in many settings (Anderson and Feder, 2007, 2004). This could also be true in context of 
India. Almost all the services provided by public sector extension have been traditionally free as 
achieving food self-sufficiency through agricultural development has been a public goal. The strategy 
of private benefits farmers derive out of it was never considered as a means to generate resources 
for the service provider. Moreover, extension was considered as some sort of public education and 
making it available free at the field level has been the accepted strategy to make farmers adopt the 
promoted technologies. In 2010, the government of India spent $300 million on agricultural research 
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and a further $60 million on public extension programmes (RBI, 2010, cited by Cole & Fernando, 
2012). 
It may seem that this backdrop makes the research experiment challenging2. However, the evidence 
from a recent nationally representative survey shows that just 5.7% of farmers report receiving 
information about modern agricultural technologies from public extension agents in India 
(Glendenning et al., 2010).  There are other subjective behavioural choice challenges that we foresee 
in affecting valuing information. Even if model delivers information in real-time; significantly 
improves development outcomes such as low-costs higher yield, greener ways of pests control, and 
also holding potential of building capacity among rural people to identify and take advantage of 
available opportunities both technical and economic over the time– (empowerment model in 
contrast to prescribed delivery model), whether or not it is a worthwhile investment from the 
perspective of a resource-constrained household is uncertain for a number of reasons.  First, 
information service is designed to be productive and preventive from the land preparation until 
post-harvest management, not remedial (damage control). Will households choose to invest limited 
resources in a ‘farm management concept’ before a farm exhibits signs of crop loss at a stage of crop 
production/ crop cycle? Related, will household value information service when many of the short-
run effects, such as improved soil micro-nutrients restored (or retained) and improved farm 
productivity may not be easily observable to or directly valued by households? Moreover, will 
household choose to invest in information service when many of the information is available locally 
by other sources, and would be able to foresee economic returns to improved farm management 
(beyond technical agriculture) after completion of crop cycles?  
The primary data is based on continuous field experiment that administers the full crop cycle 
through in-person field visits, educational information and technical demonstration, supported by 
IT/web enabled tablet that contains best practice field management package, henceforth called as 
Dynamic Agricultural Tablet-based Extension Service (DATES). To our knowledge, determining value 
of information with respect to extension service through randomised controlled trials has not yet 
been studied in the literature. With odds in the background finely aligned with unique information 
experiment set-up, our preliminary findings of the intervention suggest significantly positive impact 
on the valuation of agricultural information among treatment farmers relative to the control 
farmers. A difference of each one unit improvement in information access is found to be associated 
with 53% average increase in the mean valuation for the information.  We find that the level of 
hypothetical valuing of information varies significantly with cropping experience, land size, 
education and caste of the farmers. The study is expected to fill the gap in policy understanding that 
the household choices and the behaviour, such as the choice to invest in new agricultural 
technology, might be determined by information package which is comprehensive, real-time and 
contextual as opposed to the more generic or piecemeal information provided in some recent 
experimental studies. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual model that describes how farm 
information service fit into a household’s economic decision-making agency as a special case of 
learning identification. Section 3 describes the experimental tool, design and sample selection. 
Section 4 present balancing statistics and the empirical strategy, while Section 5 presents results and 
Section 6 concludes with discussion on further research using the experimental data. 
 
CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF INTERVENTION 
 
Heterogeneity of Information and information need 
Skipping the technical details for now, from the established literature that features concepts of self-
productivity and complementarity of human capital investments, together with learnings from 
endogenous growth model literature (Cunha et al. 2006; Huffman and Orazem, 2007; Huffman, 
                                                          
2
 Farmers would not know that we look at his price assessment of the information service as an indicator of his 
learning. For him, it is an additional cost commitment based on the learning effects.   
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2001; Romer 1986; Acemoglu 2008), we formalize our understanding that formation for human 
capital (farmer’s effort to complement his existing in-house information resources) has causal effect 
on subsequent growth outcomes.  
Literature on the "information commerce” describes that information increases in value as it 
becomes more familiar, unlike physical goods that are more valuable if they are scarce. Information 
has no value in itself; its value is derived from its understanding and subsequent application (Barlow, 
1994). For the farmer, the issue of appropriating the returns to investments in information and 
knowledge is thus central (Stiglitz, 2000). The model of bounded rationality suggests that individuals 
face limitations on their ability to use, store, or retrieve information (Simon, 1959). It is likely that 
difference in individuals’ capacity to process and assess the value of information lead to variability in 
consumption pattern, as some individuals will have little ability to use certain information, and thus 
weaker demand.  Schultz (1979) documents returns to human capital approach and recognises 
economic role for education and experience.  He portrays the idea that difference in forms of 
people’s ability to deal with disequilibria drives the variable performance under uncertainty. Hanna 
et al. (2014) developed the notion of learning failures by people with experience. While one 
dimension of the model demonstrated that experience and prior beliefs subconsciously inhibit the 
farmers to notice key aspect of production, another dimension highlighted the benefits of design of 
intervention to overcome loss from (under) inattention to data. Here, in the analysis, we position the 
concept of farmer’s valuing information to deal with uncertainty through acquisition of additional 
information (Stiglitz, 1985, 1974), together with learning of bounded rationality models (Simon, 
1959), role of human capital and experience (Schultz 1975, Hanna et al., 2014).   
Given the atomistic nature of agriculture (Klein and Cook, 2005), we provide a continuous flow of 
demand-oriented real-time ‘partially processed’ information both through in-person visits in 
combination with web-enabled tablet to enrich the knowledge sharing experience and enabling 
easier use, store and retrieval. It is not one-off ‘hit or miss’ provision of supply-driven information.  
Since August 2013, the web enabled information experiment is administering crop-cycle season-wise 
in the two districts of the Karnataka state in Southern India3. In the paper, we therefore 
conceptualise that need for different type of farm knowledge under different uncertainty context in 
the agricultural sector imparts value to information. Here, the notion of value of information is 
understood in terms of the expected benefit from acquiring (using) the varying amounts of different 
types of information under uncertainty4. In the experiment, information may appear in variety of 
forms, depending upon a stage of the cropping cycle to specific individual. The paper does not 
explicitly assess the value of each type of information, but rather the customised information 
package and economic logic underneath it unlike previous studies in the literature.  
 
Worth of the Agricultural Extension Services 
The provision of agricultural extension services has been justified in the literature on both equity and 
efficiency grounds 5 . Agricultural extension is a mechanism by which information on new 
                                                          
3
 In the research set-up, agricultural information service is unique trial-based ‘seed-to-seed’ information 
service given to farmers in their farmfields through extension advisors.  As noted earlier, we call it Dynamic 
Agricultural Tablet-based Extension Service (DATES). By design, it offers combination of interventions, 
including real-time technical advice throughout crop-cycle on (i) nutrient management; (ii) plant protection; 
(iii) crop agronomy and (iv) credit and insurance market, while mobilising real-time support and connecting 
farmers to agronomists and scientists at the back-end through an IT/web enabled tablet.  
4
 While the conceptual framework developed in this paper is specific to accessing and processing agricultural 
information for expecting better agricultural outcomes, the idea is akin to Grossman (2006) where he explains 
non-market outcomes of education (i.e. besides higher incomes).  
5
 Extension was found, in general, to be beneficial public activity. The early literature of the 1980s and 1990s 
provides evidence that extension has a direct and indirect positive impact on farm efficiency. Literature such as 
Dinar and Keynan (2001), Huffman (1978, 1980), Evenson (1997), and citations therein, provide ample 
evidence of the benefits associated with extension. Anderson and Feder (2003) highlights the efficiency gains 
from various extension modalities. 
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technologies, more effective management options, and better farming practices can be transmitted 
to farmers (Owens et al., 2003). Extension agents disseminate information on crop and livestock 
practices, optimal input use, and consult directly with farmers on specific production problems, thus 
facilitating a shift to more efficient methods of production (Dinar et al., 2007). Studies distinguish 
from the ones that focus on the microeconomics of technology adoption (see Foster and Rosenwig, 
2010 for survey) with the others that discuses advice or purely e-consulting based service to impact 
farm production practices (such as Fafchamps and Minten, 2012; Gandhi et al. 2009; Feder et al. 
1987).  In this literature, studies set-up in developing country highlights monitoring problems in a 
principle-agent framework (Anderson and Feder, 2007). For instance, political capture leads 
government agents to deliver farm information services to elite group who is associated with the 
local government rather than to marginal farmers for whom ‘incremental benefit of information may 
be higher’. Cole and Fernando (2012) notes government agents target ‘easiest-to-reach farmers’ to 
meet their performance quotas, and the problem of neglect of farmers in interior is also 
compounded by transportation infrastructure in rural areas of India. Agricultural extension is rarely 
provided to farmers through in-person visits on cyclical bases, and inability of farmers to follow-up 
on information delivered limits their scope and intention to adopt new technology (Ibid).  
The main body of research on the effect of extension services relies on the estimation of production 
functions that include extension service as one of the inputs. In general, these studies find large 
positive rates of return on extension services (Birkhaeuser et al. 1991). However, in the absence of 
random assignment of extension services, the methodology in the studies is likely to provide biased 
estimates of the impact due to endogeneity of the decision to participate in extension services 
programmes. Among the few studies that randomly allocate extension services, Duflo et al., (2011) 
show that after extension service offered for six crop seasons in Western Kenya, only 27% farmers 
on an average use fertilizer. The study concludes that slow rate of adoption of fertilizer later was due 
to farmers having trouble in saving harvest income for future fertilizer use. Preliminary version of 
the same paper by Duflo et al., (2006) notes that while farm information matters, it only goes partly, 
and whatever information is provided seems to be forgotten fast and does not even get diffused in 
their own practice let alone to friends and neighbours. Though it recognises the importance of 
learning ‘how to use fertilizer’, it is not clear to us if a problem of knowledge to choose and use 
hybrid seeds or technologies other than fertilizers was also explored in the experiment. The 
narrative informs that seeds recommended by the Ministry of Agriculture government did not 
germinate leading to total failure of the experiment. The motivation for intervention in Duflo et al. 
study is mainly focused on fertilizer use, while a possibility of mis-aligned incentives cannot be ruled-
out. Both incomplete (imperfect) knowledge and uncertainty have consequences on farmers’ 
decision making behaviour (see Rakow 2010). Although such isolated interventions may cause bad 
outcomes, a complete extension service support throughout crop cycle might gain farmer’s 
confidence (or fathom fears of neglect) supporting farmers to invest in useful agricultural 
technologies as observed in the context of India under our project reported in this paper. Hence it is 
not unlikely that failing to practice the use of right quantity of fertilizer at the right time has nothing 
to do with behavioural bias but is a result of incomplete intervention.   
Cole and Fernando (2012) finds positive significant role of a mobile-phone based agricultural 
consulting service to address problem of imperfect information in agriculture in the Indian state of 
Gujarat.  On the other hand, Fafchamps and Minten (2012), who study an impact of SMS-based 
agricultural information on farm outcomes in the Indian state of Maharashtra, finds no statistically 
significant effect of services on farm outcomes such as crop value added or likelihood of changing 
crop varieties and cultivation practices etc. during the study period. Both studies employ RCTs. While 
Fafchamps and Minten mention the spillovers issue, the other study does not discuss much on ruling 
out the possibility of spillovers across farmers in control and treatment group. Irrespective of the 
differences in findings of the studies, we do not see how authors cope with usual challenges to 
identify the treatment effect systematically that are associated with regard to use of mobile 
technology for the intervention. These include – selection bias, i.e., establishing a proper 
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counterfactual group in the research, and controlling the spillover effects. With access to mobile 
phone, farmers are able to contact members of their social networks more easily, thereby 
intensifying the probability of inter-village spillovers. This can lead to ‘broader general equilibrium 
effects, especially if farmers exchange production patterns, or marketing behaviour, and are 
concentrated within a specific geographic location’ (Aker, 2011:644). Econometrics has limits 
resolving challenges specifically resulting from the weak framework of the RCT design in the 
information dissemination experiment. In this paper, we address these issues systematically that are 
either not or weakly addressed in the existing literature through designing of the intervention 
(DATES). We discuss the experimental design and description of our intervention in the next section.   
There is also a large body of literature that does not use random assignment of extension services 
but use control groups of farmers and nonexperimental techniques to address selection bias. For 
example, Godtland et al., (2004) estimate effect of a farmer field school programme and a 
traditional extension programme on farmers’ knowledge of integrated pest management practices. 
Using both regressions with controls and matching techniques, they find significant positive effects 
for both programmes. Feder et al., (2003) also studying farmer field school programme in Indonesia, 
do not find any impact on yields or reduction in the use of pesticide.  On the other hand, using panel 
data approach for farmers from Zimbabwe and Ivory Coast, Owen et al.(2003) and Romani (2003) 
find a positive impact of extension services on yield, although note that this impact is neither 
present for all years nor for all the crops studied. Maffioli et al., (2011) using panel data from grape 
producers in Argentina, find a negative overall impact of extension service programme on yields and 
provide evidence of a positive average impact on the adoption of higher quality grape varieties. The 
study argues that it is reasonable to expect limited (or even negative) short-term effects and more 
significant positive effects once the adoption process is completed. None of these studies focus on 
valuation of information from farmers’ perspective and there seems to be limited research on this 
topic for the case of agricultural extension services. We will exploit database generated from 
randomized field assignment of DATES in order to shed some light on the important issue of 
valuation of information as an alternative proxy of learning benefits of extension service under 
uncertainty. The design of the experiment overcomes many of the econometric challenges to 
identify the treatment impact often suffered by many of the ICT-based studies including both non-
experimental and experimental studies based on mobile technology.  
 
DESCRIPTION OF THE INTERVENTION AND EXPERIEMNTAL DESIGN 
 
Experimental Tool, Research Design and Data 
Salient Features of the DATES Intervention  
In the research set-up, the agricultural information service is unique trial-based ‘seed-to-seed’ 
information delivered to farmers in their own farms by our specially trained and qualified extension 
advisors.  The following are the key features of our DATES information service: 
1. The agricultural extension advisor with individual motor bikes makes personal visits to 
assigned randomly selected treatment farmer’s fields on a bi-monthly basis throughout the 
crop cycle. Each advisor is equipped with a unique IT/web-enabled handheld device – a 
tablet. These tablets contain a range of agricultural information with audio and video 
(animation of pest and diseases) that provides both written and spoken information in the 
local language. It also provides real time connectivity with the agricultural scientist in the 
local Agricultural Universities for help with new and undiagnosed pests and diseases.   
2. The intervention provides wide-ranging information to farmers which are relevant for his 
business. The extension advisors visit the farms with the tablet that contains three main 
agricultural-based modules, such as: (i) nutrient management; (ii) plant protection; and (iii) 
crop agronomy. And, (iv) the DATES also covered information provision about agricultural 
credit such as government agricultural credit schemes, and help in tie up with bank to 
facilitate crop loan, and agricultural insurance information such as available government 
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crop insurance schemes and help in tie up with AIC (Agency Insurance Company)to facilitate 
crop insurance6. 
3. In the nutrient management module, information on crop nutrition and soil nutrition is 
provided. In the initial stages of the intervention in 2013, majority of the farmers have had 
already applied fertilizer in their field. Hence, we had to wait until the end of the Kharif 
season to collect soil sample to test and advise the farmers on the nutritional requirements 
of their soil7. For plant protection field issues, we used IT enabled interactive programme, 
named e-SAP (Electronic Solutions Against Agricultural Pests) that provide information to 
farmers in real time on pest-related problems on all the crops grown by the treatment group 
farmers8. The programme is developed and actively run by scientists at the University of 
Agricultural Sciences, Raichur (hereafter-UAS-R), Karnataka. The third module agronomy 
encompasses information on crop rotation, plant variety, irrigation and drainage, 
meteorology, and weed control. Last but not the least, intervention delivers information to 
farmers on government schemes on agricultural loan and insurance in addition to providing 
relevant information on the procedures to applying for these schemes.  
4. Although, seven field crops are identified as the focus crop for the treatment in the study: 
Paddy, Ragi, Cotton, Redgram, Bengal gram, and Sunflower, we found during the field 
experience that there has been demand for information on various other field crops such as 
groundnut, pigeon pea, chili, sugarcane etc. For example, some selected farmers in the 
project sites: Siruguppa and Gubbi, cultivate groundnut and require information on that 
crop. Although we do not study the impact of DATES on all crops that a farmer grows, the 
project provided other demand based information. 
5. The intervention also looked into the provision of treatment to the plantation in Gubbi. With 
the use of e-SAP and knowledge support of the Coconut Development Board, issue-based 
agri-information was also provided to coconut and areca nut growers in Gubbi. Note that 
analysis in this paper does not cover plantation crops; we show results based on field crops 
only.  
6. If there is a problem in the crop, the extension agents will first try to diagnose it with the 
help of material in the tablet. Along with the diagnosis, the agents also suggest remedial 
actions with a paper printout of each prescription to the relevant treatment farmers. 
However, if he was not sure about the problem then he takes three photographs of the 
affected crop parts and field conditions from different angles and submits to the online 
server. The scientist at the back-end takes care of the issues. The solutions are uploaded in 
the server and the agent further communicates it to the farmer.  
Thus, DATES is a complete ‘seed-to-seed’ treatment that fosters conditions for inclusive productivity 
growth with the provision of real-time information on agricultural technology, solution and 
communication. It provides combination of interventions, including better technical advice on 
production process, especially on the use of variable inputs (including water), with the objectives of 
                                                          
6
 Two of the important information needs that remain unmet through DATES relate to providing Livestock 
production information and post-harvest price and marketing information services. While the team identified 
farmers’ requirement of information needs for the whole agricultural value chain and planned towards it, the 
DATES model could not pursue it and had to limit the informational scope to on-farm production activities, 
credit and insurance due to certain practical challenges of the project implementation. 
7
 The crops are broadly divided into three season-wise categories, namely, kharif, rabi and summer crops. The 
kharif season starts from June and ends in September. The rabi season is during October to February and the 
summer season is between March and May. The kharif season begins from the onset of the south-west 
monsoon and ends in September (autumn).  The rabi season starts with the onset of north-east monsoon in 
October. Many crops are cultivated in both kharif and rabi seasons. The agriculture crops produced in India are 
seasonal in nature and highly dependent on these two monsoons. 
8
 Paddy, Ragi, Cotton, Redgram, Bengal gram, and Sunflower are the focus crop of the treatment  
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increasing the efficiency of the methods of production, encouraging the adoption of new 
technologies and providing integrated agricultural information service to monitor plant health.  
 
Research Sites in Brief  
The DATES experiment is currently under progress in two of the talukas in two different agro-
climatic districts of the Karnataka state in Southern India, wherein controlled trial has been going on 
for season-wise crop-cycle since August 2013. The experimental sites are (1) Gubbi taluk in Tumkur 
district and (2) Siriguppa taluk in Bellary district. Together, the study region is spread over two 
different agro-climatic zones with different crops grown, making the study broad and interesting. 
Gubbi comes under the Eastern dry zone, whereas Siriguppa falls in the Northern dry zone. In the 
Northern dry zone, the annual rainfall ranges from 464.5 to 785.7mm. About 52% of the rainfall is 
received in the months of September to December. So, Rabi is also a prominent agricultural season 
in Siriguppa. The soils are shallow to deep black clays in most areas. In Siriguppa, paddy is the major 
crop, followed by cotton. The annual rainfall in the Eastern zone ranges from 679.1 mm to 888.9 
mm. More than 50% of it is received in pre-monsoon and monsoon seasons. In Gubbi the soil are red 
loamy in most areas and finger millet (ragi) is the major field crop followed by red gram.  
 
Sample Size Calculation and Data Sample 
Each of the farmers’ groups is drawn from randomly selected 12 Gram Panchayats (the lowest tier of 
Rural Local Self Government) located in both project sites9. See the map in Appendix A(i-iv) for a 
geographical overview and classification of GPs in the study sites. The selected GPs are split equally 
between (six) control group GPs and (six) treatment group GPs separately in each district. While the 
choice of the taluka in each district was driven by pragmatic concerns, the sampling approach within 
the taluka was designed to yield a sample which is representative at the taluka level and at the same 
time, it curbs possibility of contamination of control.  The sampling strategy ensured that no 
treatment and control GPs are next to each other, which was complimented further by the 
idiosyncratic intervention design. Using the ‘tablets’ for intervention carefully addresses the problem 
of selection bias, and sequence of tailor-made treatment to randomly selected individual farmers 
spread over a wide area of the GPs (in contrast to the villages) in the study site reduces the 
challenge of knowledge spillover from treatment farmer to control farmer. 
According to the sample computations, there are 300 farmers each in control and treatment group 
in both project sites. The farmers are selected in equal numbers across all GPs10. Thus, for each GP, 
                                                          
9
 Two-stage randomisation procedure was adopted. The number of GPs in a district typically is around 30.We 
decided to select 12 GPs randomly in each district (Taluka) to ensure adequate representation of variations at 
the GPs level. At the first stage of randomisation, 12 GPs were randomly chosen from the total GPs.  Then, 
selected GPs were split equally into control and treatment groups, using randomisation process.  A constraint 
was imposed on randomisation viz. none of the control and treatment GP should be neighbours, to prevent 
flow of information from treatment GP to control GP, and a possible contamination of control farmers.  We 
used Taluka level map with GP boundaries, to take care of this issue. After some trials, we got a sample, which 
suffice the constraints and we finished the process.  Random number generation was done in excel.   
10
 To elaborate on the sampling approach, sample size was calculated with adequate significance level and 
statistical power in order to ensure the minimum expected difference between means (or effect size) in two 
groups: control group and the treatment group for our project sites, following the standard formula: 
𝑛 = 2𝑠2 [
𝑍𝑐+𝑍𝑝
∆
]
2
. In the formula, 𝑠 demotes pulled standard deviation of both comparison groups, 𝑧 is the 
standard normal variate, 𝑍𝑐   and 𝑍𝑝  are the values for desired significance level and statistical power 
respectively, and ∆ is the minimum expected difference between means in two groups (or effect size). We 
computed crop specific and site specific sample size and made educated assumptions to arrive at a statistically 
significant effect size.  Frontline demonstration (FLD) records were considered to fix the effect size to be tested 
statistically. FLD trials demonstrate the productive potential of newly released technologies in real-life farmers’ 
field conditions and point out to the yield gap between farmer’s current practices and an intervention. Based 
on the district-wise Frontline demonstration (FLD) records, an effect size of 10% increase in yield seems a 
reasonable choice under the project.  Based on layers of calculations for sample computations, team decided 
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50 farmers are surveyed. To measure intra-GP spillover effect, 10 additional farmers in each 
treatment GP was included in the survey. Although they are in the treatment GPs they did not 
receive any treatment in the project. The idea behind having this group is to capture and measure 
any spill-over if at all from the treatment. Thus, the study sample constitutes 660 individual farmers 
(300 control group, 300 treatment group and 60 spill-overs) separately for Gubbi and Siruguppa 
taluk.   
In summer 2013, we completed the baseline survey in Gubbi and Siruguppa. Detailed information 
was collected on agricultural activities, other economic activities such as livestock and dairy, other 
local or external source of agricultural information such as social networking indicators. The 
questionnaire-based survey also collected information on options chosen by farmers from three 
price bundles in India Rupees (300, 150, and 100) to reflect the valuation by farmers of the DATES 
service. During the baseline survey the team decided to get farmers response on a wide range of 
prices to get variation in the data. In Gubbi, three new price sets were introduced: {300, 200, 100}, 
{250, 150, 50}, and {200, 100, 50}. In Siruguppa, three different price sets were used: {500, 350, 150}, 
{400, 250, 100}, and {300, 200, 100}.  The higher price bundles in Siruguppa were determined 
through a pilot survey and focus group discussion which revealed that farmers on average were 
willing to pay a higher price for the same services compared to Gubbi.  
The post-treatment data on the farmers’ valuation of DATES was collected by an enumerator in local 
dialect over the telephone who never met the farmers personally. This was to limit the bias in the 
farmer’s response arising from the presence of the extension agent who had built the trust with the 
farmer over the seasons. See a note in Appendix B(i-ii) on salient observation, concerns during 
designing of the experiment and a translated script of telephonic conversation to elicit price choice 
of farmers. 
The information on the valuation of DATES was inferred through stated preference to understand 
the learning dimensions of the DATES services, rather than using the information for understanding 
optimal pricing policy for the purpose of financing the service. Many of the pricing studies debate 
over lack of revealed preference information and criticises that the stated preference information 
are hypothetical choices that might be overstated in survey response. This paper is more inclined to 
build the analysis on credibility and reliability of responses11. We believe that since treatments are 
randomly assigned across different households in customised pattern, it would ensure 
independence between the treatment status and the potential response outcomes, thereby allowing 
us to have causal interpretation of the treatment effect on valuation of DATES.  
The scope of DATES differs from that of inputs-based, ICT-based or farmer field schools (FFS) 
agriculture experimental programmes (such as studied in Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson (2008); 
Beaman, Karlan, Thuysbaert and Udry (2013);  Gershon Feder, Rinku Murgai, and Jaime B. Quizon 
(2004)) in three main ways: First, the intervention is synonymous to ‘babysit’ field crops; it is a 
continuous one that lasts throughout the crop-cycle and involves multiple real-time treatments 
(based on customised requirement). Second, the mechanism used for disseminating the information 
ranges from in-person farm visits, facilitating demonstrations of new techniques to idiosyncratic 
interactions supported by IT/web-enabled tablet for real-time farm solutions. Third, it is close 
combination of traditional and modern tools of disseminating information to farmers. We thus 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
to have 300 famers in control and treatment group in both project sites, with the hope that we will get 
sufficient number of farmers to attain satisfactory power for most of our focus crops (based on guidebook by 
Duflo et al. 2007)  
11
 Dimond and Hausman (1994) explain that evaluation involves credibility, bias (also referred to as reliability 
in the literature), and precision of responses. Credibility refers to whether survey respondents are answering 
the question the interviewer is trying to ask. If respondents are answering the right question, reliability refers 
to the size and direction of the biases that may be present in the answers. Precision refers to the variability in 
responses. Precision can usually be increased by the simple expedient of increasing the sample size. Problems 
of credibility or of bias are not reduced by increases in sample size. Thus, credibility and bias must be 
evaluated when considering the use of such surveys. 
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report treatment effects from a policy of complete ‘seed-to-seed’ continuous treatment given to the 
farmers on placing value to it. 
The key measure of interest is the impact of access to DATES on value of information, utilising the 
panel nature of the household data survey, comparing outcomes of the treatment (DATES) and 
control (non-DATES) before and after the programme. Value of information (DATES) is hypothesised 
to be affected by regressors which are invariant across panels, such as socio-demographic 
characteristics, a modified version of a “difference-in-differences” approach is employed (Ravallion, 
2008). 
A separate estimation exercise is taken-up for both project-sites: Gubbi and Siruguppa. Note that 
this paper is work in progress; hence, analysis using data only from Gubbi taluka is presented here. 
Analysis of Siruguppa will be taken up once the full data from Siruguppa arrives from the field.  
 
EXPERIEMNTAL STATICSTICS AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY  
 
Descriptive Statistics and Baseline Balance in Gubbi 
Table 3A and Table 3B compare control and treatment households in twelve gram panchayats (GPs), 
on a number of observable characteristics, as well as the key variable – value of information – which 
also manifests farmer’s learning. Although, the control set of households in GPs (Hosakere, Kondli, 
Koppa, Nallur, Nittur and S. Kodaihali) are selected for their similarities with the treatment set of 
households in GPs (Bidare, C.S. Pura, Manchaldore, Mahavanhalli, M.H Patna and Paddanahalli), 
there are couple of notable differences worth pointing out between the aggregate means of control 
and treatment households. The mean level of cropping experience of farmers in treatment GPs is 
slightly higher than in the control GPs. The reverse is true for the mean level of education of farmers, 
which is higher in the control group than in the treatment group. The percentage of farmers facing 
income shock due to crop damage (mainly through drought) is higher in treatment group than in the 
control group. Similarly a higher difference in means can be seen for irrigated land in the control GPs 
as compared to the treatment GPs.  
Table 4 presents tabulation of selected categorical variables and some key indicators varies.  The 
visit of the extension service advisor (three times vs one time) from the local government is found 
greater in the treatment group than the controlled group. Although, caste plays a critical role in 
resource allocation in Indian society, it is noteworthy that the percentage of backward class 
(including Scheduled cast and tribes) households is higher in treatment GPs than in the control GPs.  
Turning to the key outcome variable in table 3(B), we note that in the raw baseline data percentage 
of farmers in the treatment group, who are inclined to pay for the farm information, are higher in 
comparison to percentage of farmers in the control group. An intuitive reasoning could be inferred 
from table 3(A) which indicates that the treatment group faces income shocks due to crop damage 
and they are endowed with lower irrigation facility. Though difference between control and 
treatment group on these aspects is minimal, it might affect the treatment farmer’s behaviour if he 
thinks information matters12.  Post-treatment (post-2013) raw data shows substantial rise in the 
number of farmers in the treatment group, who are inclined to pay for the farm information. Some 
improvement is also witnessed in the control group. We believe that change in the control group 
occurs due to the effect of an expectation building. For instance, information about the project 
circulates through different channels – farmers visit markets and talk to each other and to 
commission agents, input shopkeepers, etc. Control farmers cannot benefit from the content of the 
information (i.e., customised project treatment) but build hope to receive it in future if they show 
their willingness to value it during the survey.  
The control and treatment group are relatively good homogeneous group of farmers to test the 
research hypothesis. As per the research hypothesis, if experience of DATES enables farmers to 
learn, treated farmers group should witness increased number of farmers willing to pay for 
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 In the pilot survey (before the start of the experiment), we found that farmers were aware that they lack 
information, and there is considerable demand for high quality agricultural information.  
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information, and also overall improvement in the valuation of information among treatment 
farmers. A more detailed econometric analysis of the data to explore the impact of participating in 
the DATES treatment on valuing information is provided in the next section.  
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Empirical Strategy 
As in Ravallion (2008), we estimate a double difference model (commonly known as difference-in-
difference – DD) using a panel of households on value for farm information outcome. The DD 
approach allows us to estimate the differential valuation of information during the post-intervention 
period between treatment (participant) and control (non-participant) farmers relative to the 
outcomes observed during a pre-intervention baseline survey.  We estimate the following regression 
model at the household level: 
 
itgtit4
it3it2it10igt
εuvZβ
n)rticipatioes*DatesPa(TargetDatβcipationDatesPartiβsTargetDateββInfoValue
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Where itInfoValue is the logarithm of choice of value of information for household i  in gram 
panchayat (GP) g at time t  etDatesT arg  is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the households in 
six target GPs of Gubbi and 0 for households in six control GPs, cipationDatesParti   is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 for households that denotes trial participation in 2014 and 0 for households for 
the year 2013, cipationDatesPartietDatesT *arg   is the interaction of the preceding two terms, 
Z is a vector of household characteristics, and it  is an error term. The model accounts for time 
fixed effect tv   by including t -1 time dummy variable in the tested regressions. The motivation is 
that time common trends and annual specific shocks might affect the investigated relationships. 
Moreover, robust standard errors have been used in order to correct for the presence of any 
arbitrary heteroskedasticity of the residuals (White, 1980). All reported standard error in the results 
are clustered by GP. We also include a GP fixed effect, gu , as the randomization was stratified along 
this dimension.  
3  is the key parameter of interest. It shows how farmers’ outlook changed in valuing agricultural 
information in comparison to other control farmers who were not provided with the DATES service. 
If DATES had the positive effect on farmers’ learning and (possibly, but not necessarily, performance 
on the yield outcome), we should find a positive coefficient.  
 
RESULTS 
 
Effects on Value for Information 
Table 5 presents the main regression results. Columns differ according to the variables progressively 
included in the specification: DATES impact without time fixed effect (column 1), DATES impact with 
both time and GP-wise fixed effects (column 2), other source of crop information (Column 3), public 
visits by Extension advisors (column 4), source of Income shock (column 5), owns mobile phone, 
owns motor bike and owns house (column 6), years of cropping experience, farmer’s age in years, 
and farmer’s education in years (column 7)13. GP and time fixed effects have been introduced as 
controls across all the specifications (2-7 columns). Based on prior farm studies, socio-economic 
characteristics of the farmer and the household, which notably could affect the use of DATES 
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 In the beginning, each of the variables was introduced in the model one-by-one and no change was 
witnessed in the results of the model.  
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services, were selected as control variables. Given the focus of this paper, we comment mainly on 
the effects of the DATES and not the other explanatory variables which are well documented in the 
literature. 
We find that participating in the DATES intervention has a significant impact on farmers’ subsequent 
valuing of the agricultural information. In column 7, the magnitude of coefficient on access to DATES 
indicates that a difference of each one unit (one cropping season) improvement in information 
access is found to be associated with 53% average increase in the mean valuation of the information 
as compared to the average valuation of households with no DATES, which is quite large.  Other 
covariates are not found to be significant on aggregate terms in influencing value of information, 
with an exception of owning a house (a proxy of wealth). The DATES effects are consistent and 
robust throughout different specification, indicating that it plays a decisive role in valuing farm 
information and services, independent of other factors that are conceived to be important in 
explaining the differences in valuing information across households in treatment and control GPs. 
Overall the results offer evidence that DATES participation led to positive improvement in valuing 
information on farm practices among treatment GPs relative to control GPs.  It is strange not to find 
significant effect of other covariates that are expected to affect farmer’s behaviour of valuing 
information. Thus, when interpreting the model, a preliminary conclusion can be drawn that there is 
some evidence to suggest that DATES intervention improves value of information significantly.  The 
findings are quite noteworthy though, given that this impact is captured within a very short time 
horizon and extension services takes time to observe change on farm-level outcomes.  
In the conceptual section we argued that if DATES is viewed by farmers under farm uncertainty as 
medium to increase their learning stock, we would observe differences in information valuation, 
irrespective of the fact that they could apply that information completely in the same season. Table 
2 indicated that all farmers in the treatment might not have acted upon all of the ‘seed-to-seed’ 
advices received in Gubbi. The regression results confirm our intuition that farmers on average value 
real-time farm information significantly because they learn and appreciate the process of DATES. 
They might not (or might) act upon the learning in farm and it is less to do with their ability to learn 
new farm techniques. Also, existing literature notes value of information changes with social 
circumstances (WDR, 2015; Fafchamps and Minten, 2012). Intuitively, it is not implausible to argue 
that farmers, particularly with long cropping experience or elderly farmers would tend to identify 
themselves with farm traditions of their forefathers and take time to be flexible towards new farm 
technology provided in the DATES. 
 
HETEROGENEOUS TREATMENT EFFECTS 
While the role of information dissemination through information and communication technology 
(ICT) in improving rural welfare is highlighted, some fear that with ICT technological disparity will 
arise, and existing socio-economic inequality and poverty will be further exacerbated. There is a 
growing concern about the effect of digital divide in which the poor, illiterate or less experienced 
farmers are less able to grasp and take full advantage of technological progress to growth (Fernando 
and Cole, 2012; Warren, 2007; Warschauer, 2004). We expect that DATES may affect various strata 
of society or group diversely. We do not claim a prior if the effect of DATES is going to be positive or 
negative although we have combined both traditional and modern extension services to enrich the 
knowledge sharing experience, while catering the farm information needs in customised way.  
We investigate empirically whether we can identify household categories that have been impacted 
by DATES more than others. We explore the hypothesis by comparing DATES intervention and 
valuing of information by education level, farmer’s age, cropping experience, landholding and caste 
system of India. 
 
Age, Cropping Experience and Education in years 
Table 6 presents DD estimates when we split the sample according to the below- average and above 
average age-group of farmers in the sample. We find that average young farmers in the treatment 
16 
 
group significantly value information (Column 1).  For a one-unit increase in access to information by 
younger farmers, we expect to see about a 73% increase in mean valuation for the information as 
compared to the average valuation by the young farmers with no DATES.  
The significant impact of the DATES disappears for the older farmers. Thus, we do not find evidence 
that DATES was much appreciated by the farmers who are older in the treatment group.  
In table 7, we explore by splitting the sample according to years of cropping experience among 
farmers. We find once again that farmers with less than average years of cropping experience 
significantly value farm information as compared to farmers who hold longer years of cropping 
experience. A difference of one unit improvement in access to DATES by less experienced farmers 
would lead to around 58% average increase in the mean valuation for the information relative to a 
less experienced farmer with no DATES.  
In light of the debate on technological divide based on education, we also analysed in table 8 
whether years of education affects the impact of DATES on valuing information. We find famers with 
no education seems to be benefitted most with DATES; we find large and significant difference in 
effect size by no education as compared with farmers of some years of education (Column 2 & 3) in 
the treatment group. We do not find evidence that those farmers with above the average years of 
educational attainment in the sample value DATES significantly, indicating a case of knowledge 
overlaps between highly educated farmer and DATES. The results are plausible as older generation 
or more experienced may be harder to get on board while younger people might be more receptive 
to the changes in farm practices caused by climate change concerns or advances in modern 
technology. This is useful finding in order to understand also the importance of mechanisms by 
which DATES works, which, as noted earlier, is a combination of traditional and modern ICT-based 
extension service14. As DATES is real time intervention, using audio and video, it serves both as 
educational tool to improve knowledge and advisory service to impart information about new 
technology. However, insignificant coefficient on the variables: more number of years of agricultural 
cropping experience or education does not indicate lack of comprehension to follow advice 
(appreciate advice). The results may be identified with ‘nuanced view of human capital’, proposed 
by Hanna et al, (2014).  
 
Farmland Size 
We investigate further whether we find evidence of heterogeneous effects by land ownership as 
presented in table 9. In our study, extension agents have experienced during their fieldwork that 
small farmers are found to be more receptive to the treatments within DATES intervention. It is 
because (according to the staff experience) local fertilizer shops give preferential advice to big 
farmers than the small ones. Therefore, extension agents in the project sometimes had to make 
more number of visits to convince big farmers to adopt farm advice (such as not to over-use 
chemicals/ and mix of two chemicals incorrectly). Empirical studies provide evidence specifically 
from a range of developing countries, including India, showing that farmers with smaller land-
holdings are more efficient in making use of new farm technology (information) (Berry and Cline, 
1979; Tadesse and Krishnamoorthy, 1997). More recent literature also identifies the inverse 
relationship between farm size and land productivity under the current land management system. 
For instance, Ansoms et al., (2008) analyse data from Rwanda finds that small production units 
perform better per land unit than larger one. The study finds that the risk-coping mechanisms of 
small-scale farmers, such as farm fragmentation, and multicropping pay off in terms of productivity. 
                                                          
14
 We also estimated the model using interaction terms separately (results available on request). We learnt 
that value of information is increasing in the lesser level of cropping experience or education amongst farmers, 
and more experience/education levels per se do not affect the magnitude of information intervention effects.  
Overall, results suggest that DATES like intervention, which makes use of ICT-based video and audio to 
familiarise information, can improve access to information to less educated people and enhance capabilities to 
make strategic choices and improve their income. The results can be identified with Harris and Rajora (2006) 
that also shows beneficial impact of ICT on rural welfare.  
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Using the farm-level panel data from Hubei province in China from 1999 to 2003, Li et al., (2013) 
confirms the similar causal inverse relationship between land productivity and farm size in China. 
Nonetheless, it remains to be verified in our experiment of evaluating impact on productivity.  
As regards valuation results of DATES, we find large and significant evidence of heterogeneous 
effects for the households with less than average size of landholdings. The result shows that for a 
one unit improvement in information access to small landholders, we expect to see about an 83% 
average increase in the mean valuation for the information relative to a small landholder with no 
DATES 
 
Caste 
Impact of DATES on farmers may vary with respect to their caste. We therefore also examine 
whether value of information (DATES) differs in context of the cast system in India. While the 
influence of caste on economic transactions might be declining due to the spread of better 
functioning markets, there is little doubt that caste still plays an important role in shaping both 
economic and social transactions in rural India (Anderson, 2011). Consistent with the recent 
literature, we find that scheduled caste (SC) households significantly place more value to real-time 
information provided through DATES intervention. The coefficient is one of the largest amongst the 
various model specifications in the paper and is significant at p<0.1; a difference of one unit 
improvement in access to DATES by SC farmers is found to be associated with more than 200% 
average increase in the mean valuation for information as compared to the average valuation of 
lower caste people with no DATES (see Table 10). This result may not be surprising despite that the 
Indian State recognises the regressive role of caste, and has progressively worked to design policies 
that reduce the disadvantage faced by lower castes. A recent study finds that farmers' access to 
formal agricultural credit (loans) is influenced by their caste (Kumar 2013), specifically in terms of 
source of agricultural production loans. Evidence indicates that an SC farmer is somewhat more 
likely to receive an agricultural loan than his OBC or higher caste counterpart from the commercial 
banks than from rural cooperative banks. In rural settings of India, discrimination against SC farmers 
is still a major societal concern. SC farmer would normally be the one more likely to prefer an 
independent source (may be a private market) for farm information when public-based farm 
information is prone to be captured by interest group from higher caste.  
From policy point of view, the results indicate that DATES as technology-based independent 
information service, all else being equal, is likely to reduce existing caste-based inequality and 
reduce poverty.  
 
ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
 
Following the basic model estimation, we conduct robustness analysis to check the validity of our 
identification strategy. Similar to Corrigan and Rousu (2006); Oparinde et al. (2014), we estimate 
random effect Tobit model that take into account both the panel nature of our data and the possible 
influence of censoring in preferences for valuing farm information (dependent variable). In Gubbi, on 
an average from pooled treatment and control sample, about 42.6 percent stated zero value, around 
19 percent stated price choice less than or equal to 100, and 12 percent equal to 300 as the highest 
price.  
Looking at the histogram in figure 1 that shows the distribution of Value of Information, we can see 
the censoring in the data, that is, there are far more cases with scores of 0, 300 than one would 
expect looking at the rest of the distribution. Thus, it makes a case to reconfirm the findings through 
use of Tobit model.  
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Figure1: Distribution of Value of Information 
 
Aggregate 2013-2014 
 
 
Treatment 2013        Treatment 2014      Control 2013       Control 2014 
 
 
We consider left censored model (equal to or less than 100), where price choices are assumed to be 
censored from below at a lower limit of the price distribution used in the experiment. Together with 
it, we consider right censored price value, where price choice is assumed to be censored from above 
at the upper limit of price distribution used in the experiment (equal to 300). It is possible to assume 
that that those farmers who submitted price equal to the minimum obtainable because of the 
intangible property of the information. Not just farmer is unknown about the usefulness of 
information service but also the choice might be influenced by their past experience of poor 
information received (or received none) from the local government/sources. With regard to farmers 
who stated maximum price choice, it could be due to perceived transaction cost of obtaining the 
information and learning about modern agricultural practices. Also, the choice might be influenced 
by comparing DATES with alternative source of information outside the experiment.  
The results, presented in table 11, once again confirm that participating in the DATES intervention 
has a significant impact on farmers’ subsequent valuing of the agricultural information. The 
magnitude of the coefficient on access to DATES is even bigger than the OLS estimation and it 
indicates that for a one-unit increase in access to information, we expect to see more than a 300% 
average increase in the mean valuation of the DATES as compared to the average valuation by the 
farmers with no DATES. The coefficient is significant at p<0.1.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper presents the results from a randomised controlled trial (RCT) of the impact of providing 
Dynamic Agricultural Tablet based Extension Service (DATES) in Gubbi taluka of Karnataka on valuing 
information. We explore a specific hypothesis in the paper – we ask if better valuation of 
information by economic agents (farmers) is thought to make up a large share of the learning return, 
which many a time might not reflect immediately in farm outcome, such as yields or pattern of use 
of information captured in agricultural practices –, which to our knowledge is not explored earlier 
using the RCT experiment in the context of providing to farmers real time farm information from 
agronomists, trained agricultural extension agents.  
The paper makes a point that because information is not useful in one year does not imply that it is 
never useful. Agricultural farmers face many different types of uncertainty and role of flow of locally 
relevant information should not be undermined. The study employs the difference-in-difference 
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model to a panel of households comparing the differential valuation of information during the post-
intervention period between treatment (participant) and control (non-participant) farmers relative 
to the outcomes observed during a pre-intervention baseline survey. We find robust evidence of the 
intervention showing significantly positive impacts on the valuation of agricultural information 
among treatment farmers relative to the control farmers. A difference of each one unit 
improvement in information access is found to be associated with 53% average increase in the mean 
valuation for the information and thus identifying DATES as an educational tool to improve 
knowledge and advisory service to impart new technology. These results are encouraging 
considering that they capture direct and relatively short-term effects of farm extension services 
(DATES) on farmer’s behaviour in valuing information. One could expect that changing farming 
practices is a long process, which would possibly reflect its effects after a long time only on yields or 
use of farm inputs. The study demonstrates effects of DATES on farmer’s valuing of the farm 
information, without resorting to yield analysis, that otherwise are hard to measure.  
We also find evidence that less educated and marginal farmers have higher value for agricultural 
information as compared to the wealthier or educated farmers, reflecting the growing disparity in 
accessing agricultural information in developing countries. These findings shed light to also 
understand that formal education is not the key barrier to grasp information; but possibly both the 
channel and design of information flow to farmers are more relevant for information to benefit 
famers.  
This study  also contributes to the behavioural economics literature (WDR, 2015), which suggests 
that the choice of farm household to invest in DATES and adopt new agricultural technology may be 
influenced by the expected costs and returns but it is equally important that farmers need adequate 
cognitive space and time to make the best decisions for themselves. Many a times, unobservable 
factors such as the pattern of learning support, farmer’s preferences and also constraints stemming 
from farmer’s own social identity playing a key role in influencing farmer’s behaviour regarding 
decision-making.  
Further research is under progress to identify impact of DATES on yields. If DATES proves to close 
yield gaps and improve welfare of farmers, a successful transition from a controlled trial setting to a 
scaled-up, applied setting will crucially hinge on devising effective information dissemination 
mechanism and pricing schemes that take into considerations household characteristics, 
expectations, preferences and constraint into account, than a generic extension service model. This 
study helps to form understanding that information that is comprehensive, real-time and contextual 
as opposed to the more generic or piecemeal information provided in some recent experimental 
studies is more powerful to influence farmers to build trust and shun skepticism towards provision 
of knowledge and information, offering cognitive space and motivation to farmers in taking 
appropriate farming risks. 
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Table3A: Control and Treatment Households – Baseline Balance Check  
Socio-Economic Characteristics- Summary Statistics 
 Cntr Trt Cntr Trt Cntr Trt Cntr Trt  
 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 
Variable Obs Obs Mean 
(Std. Dev) 
Mean 
(Std. Dev) 
Min Min Max Max P-value* 
Size of the Farmer’s Family 300 300 5.15 
 (2.39) 
5.09 
(2.46) 
1 1 19 21 0.76 
Farmer’s age in years 300 300 50.65   
(13.63) 
50.55 
 (12.73) 
23 25 86 80 0.93 
Farmer’s education in years 300 300 6.69   
(4.71) 
5.91 
( 4.77) 
0 0 18 17 .045 
Farmer’s cropping experience in 
years 
300 300 29.82 
( 12.20) 
31.67 
(12.59) 
2 5 55 67 0.067 
Farmland owned by the Farmer in 
Kharif (in acres) 
300 300 4.06 
( 3.94) 
4.68 
( 4.36) 
0.325 0.5 30 45 0.069 
Farmland cultivated by the farmer 
in Kharif (in acres) 
300 300 4.00 
( 3.32) 
4.55 
(  4.35) 
0 0 23 45 0.083 
Farmland irrigated by the farmer 
in Kharif (in acres) 
300 300 1.78 
( 2.81) 
1.63 
(2.53) 
0 0 16.5 20 0.48 
Number of visit of the Public 
Extension Advisor 
300 300 1.036 
(.44) 
1.18 
(.55) 
0 0 3 3 0.0005 
Own House 300 300 .416 
(.493) 
.55 
(.498) 
0 0 1 1 0.0011 
Own Mobile phone 300 300 1.15 
(.759) 
1.116 
( .66) 
0 0 5 5 0.566 
Own Motor bike 300 300 .52  
(.608) 
.593 
( .645) 
0 0 3 5 0.1527 
Whether experience income 
shock in kharif? 
300 300 .893 
(.309) 
.94 
( .237) 
0 0 0 1 0.0387 
* H0:  mean(T) - mean(C) = 0 i.e. C = T 
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Table 3B: Summary Statistics: Dependent Variable 
Pre and Post-Intervention Valuing of Information (Raw Values) 
 Treatment Control Difference 
Pre-Intervention Valuing Information 2013 
(% of farmers) 
53.65 % 39.32% 14.33% 
Post-Intervention Valuing Information 2014 
(% of farmers) 
80.67 % 56% 24.67% 
Difference (Increase in Worth) 27.02% 16.68% 10.34% 
Pre-Intervention Free Info 2013 
(% of farmers) 
46.33% 60.67 14.34% 
Post-Intervention Free Information 2014 
(% of farmers) 
19.33% 44% 24.67% 
Difference (Reduction in Zero Worth) 27% 16.67% 10.33% 
Authors’ calculations 
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Table 4: Tabulation of the categorical variables, Baseline 2013 
 
Control  Frequency Percentage   Cumulative  Treatment  Frequency Percentage   Cumulative  
RSK Satisfaction  RSK Satisfaction  
0=Satisfied 32 10.96 10.96  0=Satisfied 59 19.73 19.73  
1=Not Satisfied 71 24.32 35.27  1=Not Satisfied 91 30.43 50.17  
2=Not Interested 189 64.73 100.00  2=Not Interested 149 49.83 100.00  
          
Source  of Crop Information  Source  of Crop Information  
0 No information 
Source 
203 67.67 67.67  0 No information 
Source 
233 77.67 77.67  
1 Public Source= 
RSK  + KVK+ 
Marketing board 
SMS service+ Kissan 
Call Center 
45 15.00 82.67  1 Public Source= 
RSK  + KVK+ 
Marketing board 
SMS service+ Kissan 
Call Center 
62 20.67 98.33  
2 Private Source  = 
NGO+ Veterinary 
hospital+ Agri 
college+ Co-operative 
society+ Other + 
Media (i.e. Radio/ 
T.V./ Newspaper) + 
Farm magazines like 
Annadata, 
Krishimunnade, 
Krishimitra or 
Sirisamrudhhi+ Self 
9 3 85.67  2 Private Source  = 
NGO+ Veterinary 
hospital+ Agri 
college+ Co-
operative society+ 
Other + Media (i.e. 
Radio/ T.V./ 
Newspaper) + Farm 
magazines like 
Annadata, 
Krishimunnade, 
Krishimitra or 
Sirisamrudhhi+ Self 
2 0.67 99.00  
3 Informal= Farmers 
within and outside 
village + Input dealer 
or traders 
43 14.33 100.00  3 Informal= 
Farmers within and 
outside village + 
Input dealer or 
traders 
3 1.00 100.00  
Reason for RSK Visit (Rayata Samparka Kendra: Government  
office to provide agricultural facilities) 
 Reason for RSK Visit (Rayata Samparka Kendra: Government  
office to provide agricultural facilities) 
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0= 165 55.37 55.37  0= 135 45.00 45.00  
1 = collect seed & 
fertilizer  
118 39.60 94.97  1 = collect seed & 
fertilizer  
151 50.33 95.33  
2 = collect 
information  
14 4.70 99.66  2 = collect 
information  
9 3.00 98.33  
3 = other      3 = other  1 0.33 98.67  
4 = soil test      4 = soil test      
5 = to collect seeds, 
but did not 
get/receive anything 
    5 = to collect seeds, 
but did not 
get/receive anything 
2 0.67 99.33  
6 = to collect plants     6 = to collect plants  1 0.33 99.67  
7 = information of 
plantation in 
horticulture dept  
    7 = information of 
plantation in 
horticulture dept  
1 0.33 100.00  
8 = machinery 
information 
1 0.34 100.00  8 = machinery 
information 
    
9 = insecticide 
information 
    9 = insecticide 
information 
    
Caste  Caste  
1 = General;  211 70.33 70.33  1 = General;  163 54.33 54.33  
2 = Scheduled caste;  25 8.33 78.67  2 = Scheduled caste;  45 15.00 69.33  
3 = Scheduled tribe  26 8.67 87.33  3 = Scheduled tribe  28 9.33 78.67  
4 = Other backward 
caste 
34 12.67 100.00  4 = Other backward 
caste 
64 21.33 100.00  
Source  of shortfall of  income  Source  of shortfall of  income  
0= No Shortfall 23 7.67 7.67  0= No Shortfall 17 5.67 5.69  
1=Crop failure due to 
drought/Flood + Crop 
damage due to other 
reasons 
274 91.33 99.00  1=Crop failure due to 
drought/Flood + 
Crop damage due to 
other reasons 
283 94.33 100.00  
2=Health Problems of 
family member + 
Other 
3 1.00 100.00  2=Health Problems 
of family member + 
Other 
    
Coping strategy for income shortfall  Coping strategy for income shortfall  
0= 33 11.00 11.00  0= 21 7.00 7.00  
1=Sale of Land 1 0.33 11.33  1=Sale of Land 1 0.33 0.33  
2=sale of livestock 69 23.00 34.33  2=sale of livestock 112 37.33 44.67  
3=sale of other assets     3=sale of other assets     
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& commodities & commodities 
4=Found a job inside 
the village 
64 21.33 55.67  4=Found a job inside 
the village 
94 31.33 76.00  
5=Migrated in search 
of job 
 
5 1.67 57.33  5=Migrated in search 
of job 
 
2 0.67 76.67  
6=Borrowing 
 
115 38.33 95.67  6=Borrowing 
 
57 19.00 95.67  
7=other 13 4.33 100.00  7=other 13 4.33 100.00  
Visit by Extension 
service advisor 
    Visit by Extension 
service advisor 
    
0= No visit 16 5.33 5.33  0= No visit 1 0.67 0.67  
1= one visit in a 
month 
265 88.33 93.67  1= one visit in a 
month 
264 88.00 88.67  
2= two visit in a 
month 
11 3.67 97.33  2= two visit in a 
month 
12 4.00 92.97  
3= three visit in a 
month 
8 2.67 100.00  3= three visit in a 
month 
22 7.33 100.00  
Possess motor bike     Possess motor bike     
0=No 158 52.67 52.67  0=No 141 47.00 47.00  
1=Yes 142 47.33 100.00  1=Yes 159 53.00       100.00  
Possess mobile phone    Possess mobile Phone    
0=No 34 11.33 11.33  0=No 25 8.33 8.33  
1=Yes 266 88.67 100.00  1=Yes 275 91.67 100.00  
Possess House     Possess House     
0=No 175 58.33 58.33  0=No 135 45.00 45.00  
1=Yes 125 41.67 41.67  1=Yes 165 55.00 100.00  
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Table 5: Impact of Dynamic Agricultural Tablet-based Extension Service (DATES) on Valuing 
Information (DiD Estimates) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Ln(Value 
Info) 
Ln(Value 
Info) 
Ln(Value 
Info) 
Ln(Value 
Info) 
Ln(Value 
Info) 
Ln(Value 
Info) 
Ln(Value 
Info) 
Target Dates 0.243 0.096 0.150 0.139 0.119 0.253 0.277 
 [0.178] [0.570] [0.571] [0.576] [0.578] [0.578] [0.583] 
DATES Impact  1.564*** 0.534** 0.534** 0.534** 0.534** 0.534** 0.534** 
(Target Dates*Year ‘14) [0.189] [0.261] [0.261] [0.261] [0.262] [0.262] [0.262] 
Constant 2.403*** 1.464** 1.424** 1.217* 1.123 0.875 0.919 
 [0.104] [0.603] [0.607] [0.725] [0.752] [0.791] [1.395] 
Other Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
GP Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.088 0.217 0.219 0.219 0.219 0.222 0.223 
F 69.092 37.906 31.441 26.815 24.343 21.565 19.328 
N 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 
Note: Robust Standard errors in brackets * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Control variables progressively 
included in the Estimation-  Source of Crop Information (Public source, Private source or other farmer; column 
3), Number of visits by Public Extension Advisor (one, two or three visits a month; column 4), Source of Income 
Shock (crop damage, ill-health; column 5), Mobile phone factor, motorbike factor, owning house factor; column 
6), Ln(Years of cropping experience),  Ln(years in age),  and Ln(years of education; column 7 –full model) GP 
Fixed Effects & Time Fixed Effects (2-7 columns) 
 
Heterogeneous Effect of Treatment 
Table 6: Impact of DATES on Valuing Information based on Farmer’s Age (DiD Estimates) 
 (1) (2) 
 Ln(Value Info) Ln(Value Info) 
 age<=46 age>47 
Target Dates -1.140 1.066 
 [0.950] [0.657] 
DATES Impact  0.734* 0.382 
(Target Dates*Year ‘14) [0.402] [0.345] 
Constant 2.831** -0.216 
 [1.182] [1.001] 
GP Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.239 0.239 
F 6.382 14.217 
N 512 679 
Note: Robust Standard errors in brackets * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Estimates include controls- Source 
of Crop Information (Public source, Private source or other farmer), Number of visits by Public Extension Advisor 
(one, two or three visits a month), Source of Income Shock (crop damage, ill-health), mobile phone factor, 
motorbike factor, owning house factor), GP Fixed Effects, Time Fixed Effects 
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Table 7: Impact of DATES on Valuing Information based on Farmer’s years of Cropping Experience, 
(DiD Estimates) 
 (1) (2) 
 Ln(Value Info) Ln(Value Info) 
 exp_c<=35 exp_c>35 
Target Dates -0.481 0.988 
 [0.818] [0.893] 
DATES Impact  0.577* 0.464 
(Target Dates*Year ‘14) [0.331] [0.430] 
Constant 1.535 -0.216 
 [0.986] [1.495] 
GP Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.244 0.213 
F 9.720 4.636 
N 746 454 
Note: Robust Standard errors in brackets * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01;  
 
Table 8: Impact of DATES on Valuing Information based on Farmer’s years of Education, (DiD 
Estimates) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Ln(Value Info) Ln(Value Info) Ln(Value Info) 
 Edu=0 Edu<=7 Edu>7 
Target Dates 2.051** -0.558 0.226 
 [0.965] [0.958] [0.945] 
DATES Impact  1.224** 0.797* 0.024 
 [0.533] [0.468] [0.393] 
Constant -2.272* 1.527 1.553 
 [1.350] [1.605] [1.194] 
GP Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.302 0.262 0.247 
F 16.816 9.724 12.768 
N 290 380 530 
Note: Robust Standard errors in brackets * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01;  In both table 7  & table 8, 
Estimates include controls- Source of Crop Information (Public source, Private source or other farmer), Number 
of visits by Public Extension Advisor (one, two or three visits a month), Source of Income Shock (crop damage, 
ill-health), mobile phone factor, motorbike factor, owning house factor), GP Fixed Effects, Time Fixed Effects 
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Table 9: Impact of DATES on Valuing Information based on Farmer’s Land Size, (DiD Estimates) 
 (1) (2) 
 Ln(Value Info) Ln(Value Info) 
 la_ow_k<=4 la_ow_k>=4 
Target Dates -0.128 1.034 
 [0.615] [1.759] 
DATES Impact  0.828*** 0.406 
(Target Dates*Year ‘14) [0.318] [0.422] 
Constant 1.547* 0.696 
 [0.920] [1.962] 
GP Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.218 0.226 
F 14.498 8.185 
N 808 494 
Note: Robust Standard errors in brackets * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01;  
 
Table 10: Impact of DATES on Valuing Information based on Farmer’s Caste, (DiD Estimates) 
 (1) (2) 
 Ln(Value Info) Ln(Value Info) 
 Caste= General Caste= SCST 
Target Dates 0.531 2.114** 
 [0.653] [0.842] 
DATES Impact  0.120 2.121*** 
(Target Dates*Year ‘14) [0.338] [0.732] 
Constant -0.455 0.355 
 [0.980] [1.954] 
GP Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.211 0.443 
F 11.742 51.199 
N 748 140 
Note: Robust Standard errors in brackets * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01;  
 
Robustness Check: TOBIT Model  
Table 11: Impact of DATES on Valuing Information (DiD Estimates) 
 (1) 
 Ln(Value Info) 
Target Dates (d) -0.6588 
 [0.5522] 
DATES Impact (d) 3.3915*** 
 [1.1295] 
GP Fixed Effects Yes 
N 1200 
pseudo R
2
 0.098 
Marginal effects; Standard errors in brackets (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
Note: All estimates in table 9, 10, & 11 include controls- Source of Crop Information (Public source, Private 
source or other farmer), Number of visits by Public Extension Advisor (one, two or three visits a month), Source 
of Income Shock (crop damage, ill-health), mobile phone factor, motorbike factor, owning house factor), GP 
Fixed Effects, Time Fixed Effects 
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Appendix A (i)  
 
Overview of Selection of GPs in GUBBI 
 
 
 
 
Overview of Selection of GPs in SIRIGUPPA 
 
 
 
Appendix A(ii): Geography of the Study sites though Map 
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Appendix A(iii) GUBBI* 
 
Control GPs (Oval): Hosakere, Kondli, Koppa, Nallur, Nittur and S. Kodaihali 
Treatment GPs (Square): Bidare, C.S. Pura, Manchaldore, Mahavanhalli, M.H Patna and Paddanahalli 
* No treatment and control GPs are next to each other 
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Appendix A(iv) SIRIGUPPA* 
 
Control GPs (Oval): BM Sugur, Kenchanagudda, Halekote, Ravihal, M Sugur, Talur 
Treatment GPs (Square): Bagguru, K Suguru, Bagewadi, Hatcholli, Sirigeri, Karur 
* No treatment and control GPs are next to each other 
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Appendix B(i): Note on salient observations and concerns in the process of design of the 
experiment and collection of price bundles 
 
In February-March 2013, we conducted a small scale pilot survey in both the project sites to collect 
information on existing level of farm productivity, sources of agriculture related information to 
farmers, their demand for more specific information and willingness to pay for such service, 
functioning of the agricultural offices set up by the Government of Karnataka and Government of 
India, and activities of NGOs.  
Two data collection methods were employed in Gubbi at the pilot survey phase. Gubbi has Common 
Service Centres (CSC), an informal establishment at the GP level where farmers can visit to obtain 
farm related information. CSC was local government initiative but got defunct over the time. IIM, 
Bangalore (co-investigator) revived CSC working in Gubbi informally through its own funds. We used 
CSC to meet farmers to collect pilot information in Gubbi.  CSC operator took the interview 
whenever a farmer visited him/her and agreed to take survey. The other way was to talk to farmers 
by visiting them directly.  In Siruguppa, a farmers’ meeting was organized by the Head of the 
Agricultural Research Station, run by the University of Agricultural Sciences, Raichur.  Farmers were 
interviewed through an interpreter following a short questionnaire. In the process, we had collected 
information from 44 farmers in Gubbi and 28 farmers in Siruguppa. Some salient observations from 
pilot survey are as follows.  
First, about 90% of surveyed farmers do not get good quality information about agricultural 
practices and markets from government offices such as Rayata Samparka Kendra (RSK) and Krishi 
Vignana Kendra (KVK). Majority of the respondents did not obtain any training on modern 
agricultural practices and they do not have any idea where to get such information. Whereas, the 
officers at those centres would say that they advertise in local newspaper and conduct training for 
‘those who are interested’. Second, for many farmers their crop yield is lower compared to what 
could be obtained in field experiments. Third, majority of the interviewed farmers were willing to 
pay if a reliable source could provide agriculture related information to them. Based on pilot survey 
and personal communication with NGO officers, price bundles were identified.  
Non-Government Organisations (NGO) have strong presence in Gubbi. From the pilot survey, we 
came to know that two of them – Initiatives for Development Foundation (IDF) and Shri Kshetra 
Dharmasthala Rural Development Project (SKDRDP) had close ties with farmers. To know more 
about their operations, visits were made to their offices and farmer meetings conducted by them.   
The IDF requires minimum 10 persons (from different families) to form a Self Help Group (SHG) or 
Joint Liability Group (JLG). Minimum 4 or 5 SHG/JLG are required to form a CUTA (at GP level) and 
one IDF field officer is appointed to work with that CUTA. The field officer conducts classes/meetings 
every Tuesday. First and third Tuesdays are devoted to agricultural issues and the second one is 
devoted to financial issues. The fourth Tuesday is devoted to implementation. The IDF brings 
specialists to the GP/CUTA to give demonstrations or to give lecture on more specific topics. They 
print a book totally devoted to agriculture (in Kannada, with black & white pictures) and sell it to the 
farmers at INR 100. They also circulate a very innovative calendar which has a lot of agricultural 
information relevant to the local farmer. They give these at free of cost to CUTAs. If any farmer 
wants to buy for personal copy, it is available at INR 50.  
The SKDRDP also helps farmers in various ways15. The fundamental objective of SKDRDP is 
promotion of intensive mixed farming in the area using cost effective technology to increase income 
levels. In recent past, the NABARD sanctioned funding under its Umbrella Programme in Natural 
Resource Management (UPNRM) to the SKDRDP to assist paddy cultivators in Karnataka. The 
beneficiary farmers were happy that per acre yield increased in the range of 25-45%. The 
organization is regularly conducting annual Kissan Melas (farmer’s fair) and organizing training, field 
visit, installation of demonstration plots etc. for capacity building of farmers registered with them. 
                                                          
15
 http://www.skdrdpindia.org/ ;  http://www.skdrdpindia.org/pdf%20files/Annual%20Report%202011-12.pdf   
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So, we needed to be cautious in order to protect the experiment from any potential spill-over effect 
from their activities. It was impossible to know at the time of sample selection, whether the chosen 
farmer is a beneficiary of any NGO or not. However, the baseline survey questionnaire contained 
explicit questions on farmer affiliation to any NGO, and his sources of agricultural information. We 
use the information as control variables in the empirical analysis.  
 
 
Appendix B(ii): Value for Information (DATES):  Post-intervention Telephonic Conversation Script 
translated from Kannad to English. The script was modified accordingly to suit treatment farmer, 
control farmer and the spillover farmer.   
Namaskara  (Greetings). 
We are calling from IIM – Bangalore. Are we talking to Mr. Giridhar S/o Hemchand Pradhan of 
Kilinochi village? Good. We hope that our field staff visits you every month to provide you crop 
specific information (or diary writing). Isn’t it? We are a part of the same team from IIM-Bangalore. 
Are you free now? Can we talk to you for a few minutes? Ok. Thank you. 
Could you please tell us, which crop you are cultivating right now? Ok. 
We are conducting a survey on providing agricultural information for the crop you are cultivating. 
Ok. Let us ask you this question. 
The question is “Suppose if a reputed organization offers you DATES services (i.e. crop and animal 
specific agricultural information on pest control, fertilizer application, plant protection, animal 
husbandry, loan schemes, crop insurance, current prices of nearby markets) – Will it be useful for 
you ?”. 
“Suppose if an extension or agricultural agent visits you bi-weekly for providing all the requisite 
information for the crop you are cultivating - Are you willing to pay a season-wise subscription fee 
(on per acre land basis) ?” 
If yes, are you willing to pay Rs. ____________ per acre per season? Is that OK for you? 
If not then, are you willing to pay Rs. _____________per acre per season? Is that OK for you? 
If not then, are you willing to pay Rs. ___________ per acre per season? 
 
Thank you for your valuable time.  
